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SUMMARY
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable
strategies (ESS) are characterised in the cases where players have symmetric and asymmetric roles.
Introducing stochastic effects we show conditions under which the set of Nash equilibria converges
to the Nash bargaining solution as the noise becomes negligible. Two evolutionary models are given
for which these conditions are satisfied. In each case above the simulated limit outcome of the
replicator selection dynamics is given for a range of parameter values. Both approaches give
evolutionary support for the Nash bargaining solution.
(xi)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Rubinstein (1982) analysed a bargaining game where one's bargaining power comes from one's ability
to put the onus of waiting entirely on the other party. By applying the concept of sub-game perfection
he showed a unique equilibrium existed. However if we relax the assumption of complete
information, then we are again faced with a multiplicity of equilibria. Furthermore recent papers
including (Muthoo, 1990; Stahl, 1990; Van Damme et al., 1990) have shown that modification or
relaxation of some of Rubinstein's technical assumptions will also lead to multiple equilibria.
If this is the case then bargaining becomes a coordination problem. The simplest bargaining game
capturing this feature is the Nash demand game.
"Although very simple (the bargaining is reduced to the players making simultaneous
demands), it nevertheless clearly captures the strategic essence of a wide variety of
bargaining situations." - Binmore (1987, P 63)
In this paper we apply the theory of evolutionary games to describe how players coordinate on a
particular equilibrium. The necessity for using such a theory can be seen if we relax the unrealistic
common knowledge assumption. That is with a multiplicity of equilibria and a lack of common
knowledge it is not clear how a rational player should act. 1
An evolutionary approach says that on average players adapt to strategies which are relatively
successful in the previous period. In a symmetric-role game individuals are selected at random from
a population and matched, in pairs, to playa two-person Nash demand game. The classic example
is bargaining over the division of a cake. The essential difference with an asymmetric-role game is
that individuals assume different roles, like "buyer" vs "seller", "employer" vs "employee" or
"tenant" vs "landlord". Note that it is not necessary for players to have different pay-offs or strategy
choices for a game to be asymmetric in this sense.
We are interested in the limit outcomes of symmetric-role and asymmetric-role Nash demand games.
By a limit outcome we mean the limit of an evolutionary path or attractor of the corresponding
dynamical system. We examine these outcomes via two approaches. Firstly we characterise the ESS
and use the links between ESS and limit outcomes given in the literature. Secondly we provide
simulations based on the replicator selection dynamics to find the simulated limit outcomes.
1
2Given that multiple ESS exist we ask the question, which are the most stable? An evolutionary
approach leads to a natural justification for discriminating between equilibria by studying their relative
stabilities. Thus Nash's approach of studying the limit of equilibrium points of smoothed games can
be motivated from an evolutionary viewpoint. In fact we consider two models incorporating
stochastic effects, arising naturally in an evolutionary context, for which the set of Nash equilibria
converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the noise becomes negligible. Thus this paper can be
viewed as a contribution to the Nash program.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sections II and III characterises the ESS in symmetric-
role and asymmetric-role Nash demand games. In each case multiple ESS exist. However the
simulated limit outcome is shown to be close to the Nash bargaining solution for unbiased initial
populations. In section IV we show that when a stochastic process is introduced, the previous result
holds even when the initial population is biased against the Nash bargaining solution. Moreover we
show how an evolutionary approach gives a natural interpretation of Nash's limit result. Finally
section V concludes.
CHAPTER 2
SYMMETRIC-ROLE BARGAINING GAMES
Consider any two players, denoted 1 and 2, selected at random from the population. Then the set
of possible agreements is X = {(Xl>x;) E R2 I Xj ~ 0 for i= 1,2 : Xl + X2 ~ 1 } and dj= 0; i= 1,2
is the disagreement outcome. Players' preferences over lotteries on X can be represented by the
expected value of a utility function uj with domain [0,1]; i= 1,2. For simplicity we assume that in
symmetric-role bargaining games u =ul =u2, although this is not essential for our results.z
Furthermore assume u(a»u(b) if and only if a> b where a,b E [0,1] and u(O)=O, without loss of
generality. Note that the Nash equilibria of this game include every Pareto optimal allocation in X,
while the Nash bargaining solution corresponds to the equal division allocation (0.50,0.50). For
purposes of simulation we require a finite strategy set. Since, in reality, we can only ever measure
a finite number of divisions this assumption is not restrictive. Moreover the standard convex
negotiation set is used to show the limit result in section IV.
Let the finite set of pure strategies, Sj, available be denoted S, where S = {(sl,sz, ... ,sn)lsjE[O,I];
i=I,2, ... ,n}. Assume ifsjES then I-sj E S. A strategy, s, is an element of the set of probability
measures over S. That is
II
seaS - (meR II I m:sj .... [0,1]; i-l,... ,n :.E m(sj) - I}.
i-I
Let A be the n x n matrix of pay-offs where Au is the utility to player 1 if he plays his ith pure
strategy and player 2 plays her jth pure strategy. Thus
(
U(S.) 'if s.+s. s;1A _ I I J
ij u(dj ) otherwise
Let the expected pay-off to a player who plays mE dS and whose opponent plays m' E dS be denoted
E(m,m'). Thus E(m,m') = (m)TA(m'). A strategy m*EdS is an ESS of a symmetric-role Nash
demand game if V m';=m* S.t m'EdS we have
either E(m*,m*) > E(m' ,rn*) (1)
or E(rn*,rn*) = E(rn',rn*) and E(m*,m') > E(m',rn') (2)
If (1) and (2) hold then rn* is immune to invasion by a mutant strategy. We now characterise the
ESS of the symmetric-role Nash demand game.
3
4THEOREM 1. If m* is an ESS of the symmetric-role Nash demand game then either
(a) m* is the equal division allocation, or
(b) m* is a mixed strategy for which the support does not contain the equal division allocation.
In particular it has even cardinality of support, r, s.t
Sl· + s·r+1_I=l for i=1,••• /11•
Proof. Denote the support of m* as {SI*,S2*, ... ,sr*} where SI*<S2*< ... <sr*' Note utility is
increasing on the half open interval (l-si*,I-si-1*]; i=2, ...r. Thus if m' is a best response to m* the
pure strategies, t;, which make up the support of m' must be elements of the set {1-sr*,I-sr.1*, ,I-
SI*}. Since m* is a best response to itself it must be that Sj*E {1-sr*, I-s....1*, ... , I-s1*}; i= 1,2, ,r.
Consider the case where r is odd with r ~ 3. We now show the strategy corresponding to the equal
division allocation, denoted m', invades m*. By Eq.(3) and Bishop and Canning's Theorem
E(m' ,m*) = E(m*,m*). Also by Eq.(3) we can represent the support of m* as the pure strategies
1+1
Then E(m*,m') - :E m*(0.5-ai _1) u(O.S-ai _I )
i-I
1+1
- E(m*,m') < u(O.S) 'E m*(O.5-ai _I ) < u(0.5) - E(m',m').
i-I
Thus m' invades m*. That is if n is odd then n= 1. The theorem follows from Eq.(3).
o
That ESS exist in each case can be seen by noting that the equal division allocation is an ESS and the
mixed strategy "play 0.40 with probability 2/3 and play 0.60 with probability 1/3 " is an ESS. Since
every ESS of a symmetric game is a limit outcome under the replicator selection dynamics it is indeed
meaningful to talk of the stability of the above ESS. If we interpret the mixed ESS as vectors
5identifying the proportion of the population playing each of the pure strategies in S, then if the current
population is to be immune to invasion either everyone demands the equal division allocation or no
one does.
Alternatively we can simulate the limit outcome of the replicator selection dynamics, given an initial
population. A reasonable initial population is the uniform one since this is not biased in favour of
any particular strategy. The strategy set used is
( i-I. )S - St - 100 ; z-1•...•101
and the replicator selection dynamic is
[
(e.)TA(m)]
s.(t+1) - s.(t) ~I_-
I I (m)TA(m)
where e; is the ith unit vector. Then a uniform initial population implies m(s;) = 1/101 ; i=1, ... ,101.
For this case the simulated limit outcome was precisely the equal division allocation. However for
different initial populations different limit outcomes are possible. For example an initial population
close to that corresponding to the mixed ESS given above gives a different limit outcome. In section
IV we show that even such biased initial populations lead to the equal division allocation, when the
evolutionary model contains a stochastic process.

CHAPTER 3
ASYMMETRIC-ROLE BARGAINING GAMES
Many of the interesting bargaining problems are asymmetric in nature, for instance "buyer" vs
"seller", "employer" vs "employee" or "tenant" vs "landlord". In these cases the ability to condition
strategies on roles can drastically affect the evolutionary outcome - even if pay-offs and strategy
choices are identical.
The asymmetric-role Nash demand game is the natural extension of the model used in section II.
Subscripts 1 and 2 are used to denote roles 1 and 2 respectively. In particular B is the Ilz x n2matrix
of pay-offs where Bij is the utility to a player of role 2 when she plays her jth pure strategy, tj , and
the player of role 1 plays his ith pure strategy, Sj. Thus A = (Aj), B = ~) where
(
"2(t.) lif s.+t.s:lB _ J I J
ij "2('4) otherwise.
Note that the negotiation set is
X = {(X1>~ E R2Iuj(xJ~ui(dJ; i=1,2: X1+X2 S;; I}
The characterisation of the ESS for the asymmetric-role Nash demand game follows immediately from
knowledge of the strict Nash equilibria. In fact:
THEOREM 2. If m* is an ESS of the asymmetric-role Nash demand game then m* corresponds
to a pareto optimal allocation belonging to the interior of the negotiation set.
Proof. Since the asymmetric-role Nash demand game is a truly asymmetric contest we have that the
ESS are equivalent to the strict Nash equilibria.3 But the strict Nash equilibria consist of just the
pareto optimal allocations in the interior of the negotiation set.
o
That the limit outcome belongs to the set of ESS under certain evolutionary dynamic processes
follows from the fact that every ESS is a limit ESS and results on the stability of limit ESS.4
Alternatively we can simulate the limit outcome for the replicator selection dynamics given particular
7
8utility functions and initial populations. As in section II the strategy sets used are
s - (s; - ~~ I ;-1,...,101). T - (tj - ;~~ I j-I,...,IOI)
and the replicator selection dynamics are
; i-l,...,101 for type 1 players,
Then a uniform initial population implies ml (sJ= 1/101> m2(t) = 1/101 ; i,j= 1, ... ,101. The results for
a number of parameter specifications are contained in table I.
TABLE I
Comparison of Simulated Limit Outcome with Game-Theoretic Solutions - Deterministic Games
Game Parameters Simulated Nash Bargaining Kalai-Smorodinsky
Number Limit Outcome Solution Solution
1 ul (x)=x
u2(x)=x (0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.50)
dl =d2 =0
2 ul(x) = In(l +x)
u2(x)=x (0.47,0.53) (0.46,0.54) (0.46,0.54)
dl =d2=0
3 ul (x)=min(x,0.60)
u2(x)=x (0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.50) (0.38,0.63)
dl =d2 =0
4 ul (x)=x
u2(x)=x (0.74),0.26) (0.75,0.25) (0.75,0.25)
dl =0.50,d2 =0
9Notes .
- All figures reported to 2.d.p.
- Game 3 gives strong evolutionary support for the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom over
the monotonicity axiom.
- For game 4 we assumed the initial population was uniformly distributed on the interval [0.5,1] for
type 1 players, since these are the only individually rational demands. We also simulated the
outcome with the original uniform population and obtained the limit outcome (0.71,0.29).
While these results clearly support the Nash bargaining solution, by choosing biased initial populations
we can obtain vastly different limit outcomes. In the next section we show that this no longer
necessarily holds when stochastic effects are introduced.

CHAPrER 4
STOCHASTIC DEMAND GAMES
Nash discriminated between the multitude of equilibria arising in the asymmetric-role Nash demand
game by studying their relative stabilities. In fact by taking the limit of the Nash equilibria
corresponding to appropriately smoothed games he was able to single out a unique pair of demands -
the demands corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution. This work, while setting the way for
a non-cooperative approach to bargaining was not generally accepted.
"The weak line in the argument is to single out this particular pair. Nash offers an
ingenious and mathematically sound argument for doing so, but we fail to see why it is
relevant... isn't it a completely artificial mathematical escape from the troublesome non-
uniqueness? Would it have any relevance to the payers?" - (Luce and Raffia, 1957,
p.14l)
In this section we show that in fact Nash's result follows directly from two different evolutionary
models. In the first one the cake bargained over varies randomly over time while in the second
players make randomly distributed mistakes. In each case if we let the amount of noise become
sufficiently small the Nash equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to the Nash bargaining solution.
Finally we give an example of an evolutionary process for which the simulated limit outcome is close
to the Nash bargaining solution despite our choice of a biased initial population.
In order to give a relevant interpretation of Nash's result we modify his theorem slightly. The
essential difference is that the smoothing takes place on both sides of the Pareto boundary of the
original game.
Let XQ = { (x,y) I 0 ~ x ~ 1, 0 ~ y ~ 1 : x+y ~ Q },
UQ = {(u1(x), u2(y» I (x,y) E XQ }
Assumptions
(AI): Let {a,.} be strictly increasing sequence of real numbers bounded below by zero and
converging to one.
Let {Pn} be strictly decreasing sequence of real numbers bounded above by two and converging
to one.
Then there exists a functional sequence, denoted
{Pn(Xu,yJ} S.t V n,
11
12
p..:[O,l] x [0,1] -+ [0,1] is everywhere differentiable S.t
(A2): ut(x,.),uz(y..) are strictly increasing, differentiable, concave functions.
If we interpret P..(X,.,Y..) as the probability of x,. and y.. being compatible demands then
EUt(x..,y..) = P..(x..,y..) ut(x..)
EU2(x..,y..) = P..(x.. ,y..) u2(y").
Let the set of Nash equilibria corresponding to the probability distribution P.. be denoted B.. o Let an
arbitrary sequence {(x..,y..)} defined by (x,.,y..) E B.., V n be denoted {(x,.' ,Y..')} and let (XN,yN) denote
the Nash bargaining solution to the original game.
THEOREM 3. Given (AI) and (A2) every sequence of Nash equilibria of smoothed games tends
to the Nash bargaining solution as the smoothing becomes arbitrarily small. That is
(xn' ,Yn') -+ (XN,y~ as n -+ 00.
Proof. Consider any Nash equilibrium (x,.*,Y..*) E B.. o That such an equilibrium always exists
follows from the fact, a solution to
max
(x,.,y..)
ut(x..)u2(y")P..(x..,y..), exists, and belongs to B...
Firstly note that Ci.. S; x,.*+y..* < f3.. (4)
Using (AI) and (A2) it is easily seen that a necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium is also the first
order condition to the problem,
max ut(x)u2(y) for some Q E [Ci..,f3..).
(x,y)EXCI
Let the solution to this problem be denoted (XCI ,yCl). It follows from (A2) and the theorem of the
maximum (Varian, 1984, p.327) that (XCl,yCl) is a continuous function of Q. This together with (4)
implies B..e {(XCl,yCl) I Ci.. S; Q < f3..}, V n.
Thus (x,.' ,y..') -+ (xN,yN) as n-+oo.
13
o
Example 1. Suppose the size of the cake bargained over varies randomly (that is according to the
continuous pdf fJ around unity over time. Thus the bargaining problem is changing over time but
in a purely random fashion. 5
Let Fnbe the corresponding distribution function. In this case the probability of a compatible demand
when a type 1 player demands Xn, and a type 2 player demands Yn is Pn(xn,yJ = Prob (Xn +Yn~ c) =
I-Fn(Xn+yJ. Define the interval
~ = [inf (c Ifn(c) > 0), sup(c Ifn(c) >0)] , Y n and let II C[0,2].
Then assumption (AI) follows if we take {Pn(xn,yJ} to be the functional sequence arising as the
interval over which the cake size varies becomes smaller. That is ~+1 C -In, Yn. Then the conditions
of theorem 3 are met and the result follows.
Example 2. Assume the following simple dynamic formulation. Players examine the demands in the
previous period and intend to adopt the one with the highest expected pay-off. Suppose however their
realised strategies are randomly distributed around these demands. That is, if (Xn,yJ is the demand
with the highest expected pay-off in the previous period then this period's demands are distributed
around (Xn,yJ with the continuous pdfs fxn and fyn respectively. Let Fxn and Fyn be the corresponding
cumulative distribution functions. Thus, for example, FllI1(c) is the probability of a randomly selected
type 1 player's demand being less than or equal to 'c' given that the demand with the highest expected
pay-off last period was Xn.
It is natural to assume that both types of players make equivalent mistakes. Thus Fxn(a) = Fyn(b) if
a-Xn=b-Yn. Let Pn(Xn,Yn) = Fxn(l-yJ = Fyn(l-xJ. Then the demands with the highest expected pay-
off this period are the ones which maximise Pn(Xn,yJ Ul(Xn) over Xn and Pn(Xn,yn) U2(YJ over Yn. Let
~ = [sup (a+b Ipn(a,b) = 1), inf (a+b IPn(a,b) =0)], Yn and let 11 C [0,2]. Then assumption (AI)
14
follows if we take {Pn(x,.,YJ} to be the functional sequence arising as the size of the players' errors
becomes smaller. That is In+1 C ~, V n. Then the conditions of theorem 3 are met and the result
follows. In this case it implies the stationary points of the dynamic process approach the Nash
bargaining solution as the size of the players' mistakes becomes negligible.
In example 2, above, we considered an evolutionary model for which the dynamic process required
players to instantaneously adopt the most successful strategies from the previous period; at least up
to a random component. We now relax this requirement and consider the same model with the
standard replicator selection dynamics. To do this we simulate the evolutionary path. This also
allows us to consider finite strategy sets. To model the players' mistakes we assume, over the
population, that the support for a particular strategy is a random convex combination of the supports
for the strategies in an interval centred on this strategy. (The exact description of the model is
contained in table II.) We are interested in the simulated limit outcome for biased and unbiased initial
populations, when the interval is made very small.
In the case of a symmetric-role Nash demand game we chose the initial population to be that
corresponding to the mixed ESS considered in section II. That is, 112/ 3 of the population chooses
strategy 0.40, while 1/3 of the population chooses strategy 0.60. II Previously we found that this and
other similar initial populations lead to simulated limit outcomes vastly different from the equal
division outcome. With the introduction of random mistakes we get that the simulated limit outcome
is precisely the equal division outcome.
The results for the asymmetric-role Nash demand game are given in Table II. In each game we chose
the initial population such that the entire population, of both types of players, was choosing the equal
division outcome. This gave two games with biased initial populations and two games without. Table
II shows that in each case the simulated limit outcome was close to the Nash bargaining solution.
15
TABLE 2
Comparison of Simulated Limit Outcome with Game-Theoretic Solutions - Stochastic Games
Game Parameters Simulated Limit Nash Bargaining Kalai-Smorodinsky
Number Outcome Solution Solution
u1(x)=x
5 u2(x)=x (0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.50)
d1=d2 =0
u1(x)=XO..s
6 u2(x)=x (0.34,0.66) (0.33,0.67) (0.38,0.62)
d1=d2 =0
u1(x)=min(x,0.60)
7 u2(x)=x (0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.50) (0.38,0.63)
d1=d2=0
u1(x)=x
8 uz<x)=x (0.74,0.26) (0.75,0.25) (0.75,0.25)
d1=0.50,d2=0
Notes
- All figures reported to 2.d.p.
- Description of Evolutionary Model Used
- The interval for strategy i is I = [i-2,i+2], or truncated, if necessary to make it defined.
- The weighting, wi> on the central observation is chosen from the uniform distribution
between 0.95 and 1.00.
- The remaining weightings are chosen so that
WJ-Wk, 'r/j,kel, j,k"l:i and L wr1.
jel
16
- For game 6 we chose Ul(X)=XO.s rather than u1(x)=ln(1 +x) since this ensured the initial
population was biased against the Nash bargaining solution.
Finally consider the evolutionary path taken in the above simulations. If we denote the strategies
which have the greatest support in the population at any given time, s* and t* for players of type 1
and 2 respectively then figure 1 represents the evolution for game 6.
17
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The evolutionary path clear!y provides an interesting story. Initially both types of players do better
adopting lower strategies to ensure coordination. However since type 1 players are more risk averse
their gain from ensuring coordination relative to not exceeds that for type 2 players. (A similar story
would result if we had chosen type 2 players to have a higher disagreement point.) Thus the
proportion of type 1 players adopting lower strategies grows relative to type 2 players. But this, in
itself, leads type 2 players to adopt higher strategies. This dynamic process only stops when the gains
from adopting 'nearby' strategies relative to not are equalised between the two players; ala the Nash
bargaining solution.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have applied evolutionary techniques to the simple Nash demand game. For both
symmetric-role and asymmetric-role bargaining games we found strong support for the Nash
bargaining solution as an approximation to the evolutionary limit outcome. Although it is possible
for vastly different outcomes to occur in a deterministic framework our results suggest such outcomes
are unlikely when stochastic processes are included. Furthermore an evolutionary approach leads to
a natural interpretation of the result that the Nash bargaining solution should be regarded as the
solution outcome of the simple Nash demand game because it is the 'only necessary limit of the
equilibrium points of smoothed games'.
19
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FOOTNOTES
A good discussion of these and other related issues is contained in Crawford (1990).
All we require is U1 and Uz are selected randomly from the same distribution of utility functions
in the population.
For the technical definition of a truly asymmetric context and proof of the equivalence of ESS,
strict Nash equilibria, and locally stable strategies for such contests see Van Damme (1987,
pp.234-236).
See for instance theorem 9 in Samuelson and Zhang (1990, p.22).
Alternatively we could have assumed the players beliefs about the actual bargaining problem
changed randomly over time.
21
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